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SUMMARY  
 
THE DIRECT EFFECT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS OF THE EU 
 
 
1.    Research Questions  
 
This thesis investigates in which situations, according to the case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter ‘the Court’), Union 
fundamental rights have direct effect and whether this can be considered to be 
legitimate, particularly in the light of the principle of allocation of powers. 
Three sub-questions are answered: 
 
(i)  In which situations, according to the case law of the Court, Union 
fundamental rights have direct effect (state of the law)? 
(ii)  To what extent can this case law be considered to be legitimate, 
particularly in the light of the principle of allocation of powers 
(legitimacy and judicial activism)? 
(iii) On which points is further clarification needed (outstanding questions 
and concerns)? 
 
2.    Scope and Structure  
 
The research focuses on Union fundamental rights deriving from the ‘court-
made’ general principles of Union law (Article 6 (3) TEU) and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 6 (3) TEU) (hereinafter: 
the Charter). The concept of direct effect is used to describe the way in which 
Union law influences proceedings before national courts. This effect will be 
considered as ‘direct’ if Union law applies as an autonomous ground for legal 
review before a national court. The use of Union law as an autonomous ground 
for review can be contrasted with the use of Union law as a tool of inter-
pretation of national legislation (indirect effect).  
 
The legitimacy of the Court’s case-law is evaluated in the light of the following 
factors: clarity and soundness of the reasoning, consistency and coherence and 
legal certainty. Particular attention is paid to the principle of allocation of 
powers. This concept can be subdivided into the horizontal and vertical 
allocation of power. The horizontal allocation of powers, also known as 
‘institutional balance’ or ‘the principle of separation of powers of the Union’, is 
enshrined in Article 13 (2) TEU: 
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“Each institution shall act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the 
Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set 
out in them. The institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation.” 
 
The vertical allocation of powers deals with the division of powers between the 
Union and its Member States and is laid down in Article 5 (2) TEU:  
 
“Under the principle of conferral, the Union shall act only within the limits 
of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties 
to attain the objectives set out therein. Competences not conferred upon the 
Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.” 
 
The research is divided into two main parts: the direct effect of Union 
fundamental rights in proceedings initiated by private parties against public 
parties (vertical direct effect) and the direct effect of Union fundamental rights 
in proceedings initiated by private parties against another private party 
(horizontal direct effect) of Union fundamental rights. Both parts contain a 
mapping of the relevant case law of the Court and an evaluation of that case law 
in the light of the principle of allocation of powers.  
 
3.    Findings on Vertical Direct Effect 
 
3.1   Stand of the Law 
 
The vertical direct effect of Union fundamental rights was recognized by the 
Court already some time ago. The landmark cases are Wachauf1 and ERT2. These 
cases involve the vertical direct effect of Union fundamental rights as general 
principles of Union law. Since then, vertical direct effect has been recognized in 
a considerable number of cases. The existence of vertical direct effect of Union 
fundamental rights has been confirmed in Article 51 (1) of the Charter. 
According to his provision the Charter is only binding upon the Member States 
“when they are implementing Union law”. The Explanations relating to Article 
51 (1) of the Charter refer to acting within “the scope of Union law”. Article 51 
(1) of the Charter already gained substantial attention in the case law of the 
Court. It turns out that the scope of application of the Charter and of general 
principles of Union law is the same.  
 
According to the case law on general principles of Union law and to later case 
law concerning the Charter, the minimum requirement for the application of                                                         
1  CJEU 13 July 1989, case 5/88, Wachauf.  
2  CJEU 18 June 1991, case C-260/89, ERT.  
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Union fundamental rights is that there must be a connection with Union law.3 
However, not every connection with Union law suffices to trigger the 
application of general principles of Union law or the Charter.4 The national act 
at issue must qualify as an act of implementation. The concept of ‘implement-
ation covers all execution (‘mise en œuvre’) of Union law by the Member States. 
It can be divided in two main forms of implementation: implementation à la 
Wachauf and implementation à la ERT. I consider these two main categories as 
exhaustive. 
 
In a Wachauf situation, a Member State is acting as ‘agent’ of the EU. The 
Wachauf implementation covers a wide range of situations. I classified the case 
law in four subcategories of national acts that cover the existing case law of the 
Court:  
 
i. Classic acts of implementation5: 
 This category covers national acts that are taken on the ground of a 
specific duty of implementation, e.g. the implementation of a Directive.  
ii. The exercise of the powers conferred by Union law6: 
 An example of this category are decisions made by the Member States on 
the basis of a discretion or exception available to them under EU 
legislation.  
iii. Acts falling within the scope of Union legislation7: 
 This category essentially concerns the omission of implementation. 
iv. Remedies, sanctioning and enforcement8: 
 This category can be seen as measures implementing the duty of sincere 
cooperation laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU. According to this principle, 
in absence of relevant EU rules, Member States are obliged to ensure the 
effectiveness of EU rights and duties of Union law. Measures falling 
within the national procedural autonomy are an example of this category. 
 
                                                        
3  See e.g. CJEU 1 March 2011, Case C-457/09, Chartry, paras. 22-25.  
4  See e.g. CJEU 11 November 2010, Case C-20/10, Vino I, paras 53, 54, 56, 57 and 64 and 
CJEU 22 June 2011, C-161/11, Vino II, paras. 38 en 39.  
5  See e.g. CJEU 10 July 2003, Joines Cases C-20/00 en C- 64/00, Booker Aquaculture; CJEU 
12 September 2006, Case C-300/04, Eman en Sevinger.  
6  See e.g. CJEU 6 December 2012, Joined Cases C-356/11 en C-357/11, O. and S; CJEU 22 
October 2013, Case C-276/12, Sabou. 
7  See e.g. CJEU 19 January 2010, Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci. 
8  See e.g. CJEU 10 November 2011, Case C-405/10, Garenfeld; CJEU 26 February 2013,  
Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson; CJEU 26 September 2013, Case C-418/11, Texdata 
Software.  
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I do not consider it likely that future case law will result in additional Wachauf 
subcategories, but this cannot be excluded 
 
The second main category, ERT implementation, concerns the situation in 
which a Member State uses an exception provided for by EU law in order to 
justify a national act that falls a priori under a prohibition of Union law. The ERT 
route applies, in any case, to measures qualifying as restrictions of the free 
movement. It is likely that it will also apply outside free movement situations, 
for example in Zambrano situations that concern national measures having the 
effect of depriving citizens of the Union of the genuine enjoyment of the 
substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as citizens of the Union 
(Article 20 TEU).9 With regard to the application of the ERT route, it is 
important to make a distinction between, on the one hand, the qualification of a 
national measure as ‘restriction of free movement’ or as a ‘deprivation of citizen 
rights’ and, on the other hand, the question whether the restriction or 
deprivation can be justified on grounds of a derogation of Union law. Vertical 
direct of Union fundamental rights is only legitimate at the second stage, and. 
therefore only after an assessment that the national act at issue qualifies as a 
‘restriction’ or deprivation’. Only in that scenario will the national acts fall 
within the scope of Union law. In addition to this, it is possible that fundamental 
rights pop up at the first stage, namely as relevant factors in the qualification of a 
measure as a ‘restriction’ or deprivation’.  
 
Union fundamental rights do not have direct effect in situations that cannot be 
brought under the two main categories of Wachauf and ERT, even though it is 
possible to discern some sort of EU link. Examples of the case law in which the 
EU connection is not sufficient to trigger the application of Union fundamental 
rights are: 
 
i.  The sole existence of Union powers in the field of the situation at issue10; 
ii.  The situation at issue concerns a Union citizen from another Member 
State; 
iii.  The national act qualifies as ‘more stringent protective measures of 
domestic law’ (acts going beyond the minimum requirements laid down 
by Union)11; 
iv.  The sole fact that the claimant in the main proceedings relies on Union 
law;12                                                         
9  CJEU 8 March 2011, Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano; CJEU 8 May 2013, Case C-87/12, 
Ymeraga. 
10  CJEU 18 December 1997, Case C-309/96, Annibaldi. 
11  CJEU 17 December 1998, Case C-2/97, Borsana. 
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v.  The situation concerns a subject matter that is covered in a broad 
manner by Union law;13 
vi.  Voluntary references in national law to Union law14;  
vii.  Voluntary provisions of national law providing for compensation for 
damage sustained as a result of the adoption of national protection 
measures in accordance with EU law;15 
viii. A purely hypothetical prospect of exercising free movements rights.16 
  
3.2   Legitimacy and Judicial Activism 
 
The vertical direct effect of Union fundamental rights in Wachauf and ERT 
settings is legitimate as a necessary corollary of the principle that the Union is 
bound by ‘the rule of law’, since the implementation and application of Union 
law often takes place at the national level. Moreover, the duty for Member 
States to respect fundamental rights when implementing Union law has been 
confirmed in Article 51 (1) of the Charter. The ultimate test for the legitimacy 
of vertical direct effect of a Union fundamental right in a specific situation is the 
question whether the application of Union law in conformity with fundamental 
rights is at issue. When this is the case, vertical direct effect is justified. When 
this is not the case, the situation is a purely internal situation in which Union 
fundamental rights do not apply. 
 
The pre and post Charter case law of the Court regarding vertical direct effect of 
fundamental rights shows judicial restraint. The Court generally respects the 
limits of Article 51 (1) of the Charter in the sense that the applicability of Union 
fundamental rights is indeed confined to situations in which the application of 
Union law in conformity with fundamental rights is at stake. An exception to 
this overall picture was established in the Chatzi case in which the equality 
principle was applied outside the context of Union law.17  
 
It must be furthermore noted that sometimes the Court applies Union 
fundamental rights in spite of strong opposing views of Member States and 
even of the European Commission, for example in the Åkerberg Fransson, Sabou 
                                                                                                                                  
12  CJEU 8 May 2013, Case C-87/12, Ymeraga. The sole reliance on Union law might however 
trigger the application of Art. 47 of the Charter. 
13  CJEU 15 September 2011, Joined Cases C-483/09 en C-1/10, Gueye and Sanchez.  
14 CJEU 21 December 2011, Case C-482/10, Cicala. 
15  CJEU 22 May 2014, Case C-56/13, Érsekcsanádi Mezőgazdasági.  
16  CJEU 29 May 1997, Case C-299/95, Kremzow 
17  CJEU 16 September 2010, Case C-149/10, Chatzi.  
349
THE DIRECT EFFECT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EU   
 
and Toshiba cases.18 In my view, these cases fit the Article 51 (1) of the Charter 
criterion. However, numerous and strong opposing views call for extra precise 
reasoning. Toshiba is an example in which the Court failed to carry out this extra 
precise reasoning. Another point of attention is the reasoning of judgments that 
fit in the line ERT. As mentioned earlier, the vertical direct effect of Union 
fundamental rights is in principle legitimate, but this is only after the national act 
at issue is qualified as a ‘restriction of free movement’ or as a ‘deprivation of 
citizen rights’. The Court seems to apply this classification, but there are two 
cases that might be confusing: the Karner and Dereci cases.19 These cases could 
be read as the possibility of granting of vertical direct effect of a Union 
fundamental right to national acts that do not a priori qualify as a ‘restriction’ or 
‘deprivation’. In my view, however, this is not what the Court intended to do. I 
do not think the Court overstepped its purview, but the cases are unfortunate 
and do exemplify the necessity of clear and precise reasoning.      
 
I consider the case law regarding the vertical direct effect of Union fundamental 
rights legitimate in the light of the principle of allocation of powers, as the 
Court generally respects the limits of Article 51 (1) of the Charter. In the 
meantime I note that even though it is possible to explain the majority of the 
cases in the light of Article 51 (1) of the Charter, the cases often lack such 
explanation. The overall legitimacy of the approach would strengthen if the 
different situations of (non-) implementation and their doctrinal underpinnings 
would be more explicit. In the next section concrete recommendations will be 
made. 
    
3.3   Questions and concerns 
 
The case law on vertical direct effect is settled. The two main categories, 
Wachauf and ERT, and the refinement of the Wachauf spectrum into four 
subcategories offers considerable clear insight. However, the case law could be 
clarified and refined on the following points: 
 
Clarification of the Wachauf subcategory iv (remedies, sanctioning and enforcement)  
This subcategory could be more explicit. It could be clarified in these kinds of 
cases that Union fundamental rights apply because the national acts at stake 
could be considered as the implementation of Article 4 (3) TEU (the duty of                                                         
18  CJEU 26 February 2013, Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson; CJEU 22 October 2013, Case 
C-276/12, Sabou; CJEU 14 February 2012, Case C-17/10, Toshiba.  
19  CJEU 25 March 2004, Case C-71/02, Karner; CJEU 15 November 2011, Case C-256/11, 
Dereci. 
350
SUMMARY  
  
sincere cooperation). In addition, it would be helpful to identify explicitly which 
duty is at issue by virtue of Article 4 (3) TEU.  
 
Consistency with regard to national acts falling within the national procedural 
autonomy 
The fundamental rights of the Union also apply to national acts falling within 
the national procedural autonomy. The case law is however not consistent with 
regard to the relationship between, on the one hand, the Rewe principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness and, on the other hand, the fundamental rights.20 
In some cases, such as Allassini and Ecotrade, the fundamental rights review 
takes place separately.21 In other cases, like in Pohotovost, fundamental rights 
are examined as part of the Rewe principle of effectiveness.22 In VEBIC and H.N. 
the Court only examined in the light of fundamental rights without referring to 
the Rewe principles. Consistency is needed.23 I would opt for a clear separation 
between, on the one hand, the application of fundamental rights and, on the 
other hand, the Rewe principles of equivalence and effectiveness.   
 
Minimum harmonization, gradual harmonization and standstill 
According to Borsana, Eiterköpfe and Dominguez, Union fundamental rights do 
not seem to apply to national acts going beyond minimum requirements laid 
down by Union legislation (‘more stringent protective measures of domestic 
law’).24 However Chatzi causes confusion, as it seems to be a case in which the 
Court did apply fundamental rights to more stringent protective measures of 
domestic law.25 An explicit confirmation that fundamental rights, in principle,26 
do not apply to more stringent protective measures of domestic law would be 
useful. In addition to that, it could be clarified why those measures fall outside 
the scope of Union law and how they differ from measures under Wachauf 
subcategory ii (the exercise of the powers conferred by Union law). In my view, 
the distinction is that more stringent protective measures of domestic law are 
not taken on the basis of powers created by Union law but on the basis of powers 
in relation to which Union law confirms that they remained powers of the 
Member States. The same kind of questions arise with regard to national                                                         
20  CJEU 16 December 1976, Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz en Rewe-Zentral.  
21  CJEU 18 March 2010, Joined Cases C-317/08, C-318/08, C-319/08 and C-320/08, 
Allassini; CJEU 8 May 2008, Joined Cases C-95/07 and C-96/07, Ecotrade. 
22  CJEU 27 February 2014, Case C-470/12, Pohotovost. 
23  CJEU 7 December 2010, Case C-439/08, VEBIC; CJEU 8 May 2014, Case C-604/12, H.N. 
24  CJEU 17 December 1998, Case C-2/97, Borsana; CJEU 14 April 2005, Case C-6/03, 
Eiterköpfe; CJEU 24 January 2012, Case C-282/10, Dominguez.  
25  CJEU 16 September 2010, Case C-149/10, Chatzi. 
26  See for a possible exception: CJEU 18 July 2013, Case C-234/12, Sky Italia. 
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measures that are (still) allowed under gradual harmonization legislation or 
standstill clauses.  
 
Refinement of the Kücükdeveci criterion on the scope of Union law  
In Kücükdeveci, the prohibition of discrimination based on age applied, because 
the national act at issue concerned a subject matter (dismissal) that was covered 
by a non-discrimination Directive (Directive 2000/78).27 Even though I agree 
that the national act at issue falls within the scope of Union law (namely as a 
measure that can be considered as a failure to implement Directive 200/78), the 
criterion that is used to define the ‘scope of Union law’ is too broad. In Vino I and 
Vino II, the Court is more precise by considering both whether the relevant 
directive (Directive 1999/70) covers the subject matter of the national act at 
issue and whether the alleged discrimination falls under that directive.28     
 
Reasoning in the twilight zone  
In Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte, the Court considered that the national 
measure at issue could not be considered to be implementation in the sense of 
Article 51 (1) of the Charter.29 The Court just stated that there was no concrete 
element. However, the preliminary reference mentions that the Portuguese 
measure had been taken to consolidate public finances in a serious economic 
and financial crisis with a view to general obligations deriving from the Stability 
and Growth Pact. It is unfortunate that the Court did not explain why the 
connection with the Stability and Growth Pact was insufficiently concrete. 
 
Application of Article 47 of the Charter 
As a general rule Union fundamental rights only apply in disputes actually 
falling within the scope of substantive Union law. Possibly there is an exception 
to this rule with regard to Article 47 of the Charter (Right to an effective 
remedy and to a fair trial). It seems that this provision applies as soon as the 
applicant in the main proceedings relies on a substantive rule of Union law.30 
Future case law will have to clarify whether this assumption is correct. 
 
Application of ERT route outside of free movement situations 
It is likely that the ERT route not only applies in free movement situations, but it 
applies in all situations in which a Member State needs to benefit from the                                                         
27  CJEU 19 January 2010, Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci. 
28  CJEU 11 November 2010, Case C-20/10, Vino I, paras 53, 54, 56, 57 and 64 and CJEU 22 
June 2011, C-161/11, Vino II, paras. 38 en 39.  
29  CJEU 7 March 2013, Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte. 
30  CJEU 7 February 2013, Case C-498/12, Pedone; CJEU 7 February 2013, Case C-499/12, 
Gentile; CJEU 14 March 2013, Case C-555/12, Loreti; CJEU 30 May 2013, Case C-73/13, T. 
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exceptions provided for by EU law in order to justify a measure that would 
otherwise be prohibited. However, this has not been considered in a clear cut 
way in the Court’s case law. Future case law has to give a decisive answer. 
 
4.    Horizontal direct effect 
 
4.1   State of the Law 
 
The horizontal direct effect of Union fundamental rights is a given in the current 
state of the law but with a great amount of unknown factors. The landmark cases 
for the existence of horizontal direct effect of Union fundamental rights are 
Mangold and Kücükdeveci.31 In these cases, the horizontal direct effect of the 
prohibition of discrimination based on age was recognized (Mangold and 
Kücükdeveci). In addition, these cases implicitly revealed that the Mangold/ 
Kücükdeveci horizontal direct effect applies to all Article 19 TFEU grounds of 
non-discrimination: sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, 
or sexual orientation. AMS clarified that other fundamental rights can also be 
capable of having horizontal direct effect and that the Mangold/ Kücükdeveci 
approach in principle applies both to fundamental rights as general principles of 
Union law and as fundamental rights under the Charter.32  
 
The crucial question is under which conditions the Mangold/Kücükdeveci 
horizontal direct effect applies. Since the approach lacks sufficient reasoning 
and is controversial from several perspectives, a prudent reading is appropriate. 
So far, it is only safe to say that Mangold/Kücükdeveci horizontal direct effect will 
apply in circumstances that are comparable to those cases. When looking at the 
Mangold and Kücükdeveci cases in conjunction with AMS, it is possible to distil 
four conditions for the application of the Mangold/Kücükdeveci horizontal direct 
effect. Firstly, the fundamental right at issue should be unconditional and 
sufficiently precise. This is the usual technical requirement for direct effect. If 
this requirement is not fulfilled, it is certain that direct effect is out of question. 
Secondly, the alleged violation of a fundamental right should be a public act. 
Thus, the horizontal direct effect should result in the examination on the basis of 
a Union fundamental right of a public act. It is not certain whether purely private 
acts (such as factual behaviour or contractual clauses) should also be reviewed 
on the basis of Union fundamental rights. Future case law has to clarify this 
issue. The third condition is the application of Article 51 (1) of the Charter. The                                                         
31  CJEU 22 November 2005, Case C-144/04, Mangold; CJEU 19 January 2010, Case C-
555/07, Kücükdeveci. 
32  CJEU 15 January 2014, Case C-176/12, AMS. 
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object of review should qualify as ‘the implementation of Union law’. The 
existence of this condition is a given; horizontal direct effect of Union 
fundamental rights cannot occur outside the scope of Union law. Finally, the 
existence of a fourth condition cannot be excluded. This condition would be that 
it concerns a situation falling within the scope of Union legislation (for example 
a non-discrimination directive) that expresses the fundamental right at issue and 
that applies in the private sector. I tend to believe that this condition does not 
exist. However, the existing case law is not conclusive. Future case law has to 
clarify this.   
 
The concrete result of Mangold and Kücükdeveci is that prohibitions of non-
discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, 
age, or sexual orientation contained in non-discrimination directives have ‘de 
facto’ horizontal direct effect.33  
 
4.2  Legitimacy and judicial activism 
 
The issue of horizontal direct effect of Union fundamental rights is far more 
complex and controversial then the issue of vertical direct effect. It involves the 
application of fundamental rights in the private sphere (third-party effect or 
‘Drittwirkung’ of fundamental rights or ‘constitutionalisation of private law’) and 
it therefore deviates from the classic ‘rule of law’ function of fundamental rights 
as a means to protect private individuals against public authorities. Third-party 
effect of fundamental rights is a sensitive topic on which the views in the 
Member States differ. In most Member States, the use of fundamental rights as 
an autonomous basis of examination in horizontal disputes is not accepted and 
controversial. Moreover, the limits of Article 51 (1) of the Charter are relevant 
in this context. According to this provision, the Charter is addressed to the 
Union and to the Member States. The provision does not mention private 
individuals. In my view, this means that there is no duty for private individuals to                                                         
33  Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16–22; Directive 
2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between 
persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, [2002] OJ L 180/22; Directive 2006/54 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of 
employment and occupation (recast), [2006] OJ L 204/23; Directive 2010/41/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on the application of the principle of 
equal treatment between men and women engaged in an activity in a self-employed capacity 
and repealing Directive 86/613/EEC, [2010] OJ L 180/1; Directive 2004/113/EC of 13 
December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women 
in the access to and supply of goods and services, [2004] OJ L 373/37. 
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respect Union fundamental rights as such. On the other hand, arguably, certain 
fundamental rights might also need protection in horizontal situations, for 
example in the light of their purpose or wording or by virtue of the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights. This complex constitutional setting 
should be reason for judicial restraint and sophistication. The Mangold/ 
Kücükdeveci approach, however, seems to be the opposite. In my view, this 
approach lacks legitimacy due to several reasons.    
 
The Mangold /Kücükdeveci approach firstly involves a third-party effect that goes 
beyond the commonly accepted horizontal function of fundamental rights as a 
tool of interpretation. It must, however, be noted that Mangold /Kücükdeveci 
involved the review of public acts in a horizontal setting. This is less 
controversial than the review of private acts in a horizontal setting. As was 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, it is not certain that the Court is willing to 
accept horizontal direct effect of fundamental rights in situations involving the 
review of private acts. The difference between the review of public acts and the 
review of private acts is that the latter implies the duty for private parties to 
respect fundamental rights, whereas in the case of the review of public acts, it is 
still possible to focus on a vertical element. This is also a relevant distinction 
with a view to Article 51 (1) of the Charter that seems to exclude the possibility 
of the review of a private act. The review of a public act, on the other hand, does 
not manifestly violate Article 51 (1) of the Charter.  
 
Secondly, the principle of non-discrimination is expressed in several Directives. 
This reflects the decision of the Union legislature to render prohibitions of 
discrimination effective in the private sector through national legislation. After 
all, directives do not have horizontal direct effect. The Mangold /Kücükdeveci 
approach thwarts this decision, as it leads to de facto horizontal direct effect of 
the prohibitions of discrimination in the directives. 
 
Thirdly, there were more sophisticated options available to render the principle 
of non-discrimination or fundamental rights in general effective in horizontal 
settings, such as the duty to interpret national and Union legislation in the light 
of Union fundamental rights or the Francovich doctrine of State liability.34 
Another possibility would have been classification comparable to that of the 
national procedural autonomy, according to which Union law would oblige the 
national judge to enforce a fundamental right at issue in a horizontal dispute, but 
it would leave it to the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate 
the applicable judicial techniques and remedies.                                                          
34  CJEU 19 November 1991, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Francovich. 
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Fourthly, by recognizing the possibility of horizontal direct effect in situations 
that involve the review of public acts, the Court had manoeuvred into an 
awkward position in which it eventually has to choose between two evils. There 
will come a moment in which the Court has to rule on the possibility of 
horizontal direct effect in situations involving the review of private acts. The 
rejection of that option would amount in a (new) splitting up of the concept of 
horizontal direct effect between situations that involve the review of a public act 
(horizontal direct effect possible) and situations that involve the review of a 
private act (no horizontal direct effect). This would be inconsistent with the case 
law on the (total lack of) horizontal direct effect of Directives. On the other 
hand, the acceptance of full horizontal direct effect would, in my view, 
manifestly violate Article 51 (1) of the Charter, because it implies the duty for 
private individuals to respect Union fundamental rights.   
 
Finally, Mangold and Kücükdeveci do not explain why the principle of non-
discrimination should be enforced in a private setting. This is not self-evident. 
The lack of explanation is unsatisfactory, especially in the light of the 
commotion and resistance after Mangold. Thorough reasoning would benefit 
the acceptance of the approach and therewith its legitimacy.  
 
4.3   Questions and concerns 
 
Foundation of the approach 
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, Mangold and Kücükdeveci do not 
explain why the principle of non-discrimination should be effective in a 
horizontal setting. This evokes considerable legal uncertainty, because the 
foundation of the approach also determines its reach. It is recommendable that 
the Court unfolds on what grounds the principle of non-discrimination (or 
other fundamental rights) should be effective in a horizontal setting.    
  
Relevance of the interplay between the principle of non-discrimination and Directive 
2000/78   
Mangold and Kücükdeveci are not conclusive on the question whether the 
principle of non-discrimination based on age has full horizontal direct effect or 
that the horizontal direct effect is limited to specific situations falling within the 
scope of application of non-discrimination directives such as Directive 2000/78. 
An explanation on this issue would be useful. In my view, it would be best to cut 
the intense entanglement between Union fundamental rights and secondary 
law. In particular, it is not desirable to indentify the content of a fundamental 
right as a general principle of Union law or under the Charter with that of 
secondary legislation. 
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Existence of full horizontal direct effect 
So far, it is not clear whether horizontal direct effect of a Union fundamental 
right would be possible if it would function as a basis for the examination of 
purely private acts. I propose that this option should be denied, because it would 
lead to a duty for private parties to respect fundamental rights. I consider this to 
be a manifest violation of Article 51 (1) of the Charter. I realize that this will 
result in an inconsistency with the Court’s case law on the (full denial) of 
horizontal direct effect of directives, however, with Mangold and Kücükdeveci, 
the Court embarked on a path ultimately leading to a choice between two evils. 
The inconsistency with the doctrine of horizontal direct effect of directives 
seems to be the best evil. 
 
5.    Final conclusion 
 
The doctrines of vertical and horizontal direct effect contrast with each other. 
The doctrine of vertical direct effect blossomed. Both its existence as well as its 
elaboration in the case law seems legitimate. It does remain difficult to formulate 
a concrete test to determine in which situations vertical direct effect of Union 
fundamental rights occurs. However, thanks to a considerable amount of 
consistent case law it is possible to classify five situations in which Union 
fundamental rights do have vertical direct effect. On the contrary, the doctrine 
the horizontal direct effect of Union fundamental rights is scarcely out of the 
egg. The little case law is puzzling. The reach of the doctrine is shadowy. Its 
legitimacy is scant.  
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